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Abstract 
Portuguese and Spanish universities have adopted well-defined royalty sharing schedules over 
the last fifteen years. We investigate whether such royalty sharing schedules have been effective 
in stimulating inventors’ efforts and in ultimately improving university outcomes. We base our 
empirical analysis on university-level data and two new self-collected surveys for both 
inventors and Technology Transfer Offices (TTOs). Evidence from the inventors’ survey 
indicates that one third of respondents are incentivised by current royalty sharing schedules, one 
third could be incentivised by higher royalty shares, and the remaining third is totally insensitive 
to royalty sharing. Plain regressions on university level datasets suggest that the incentive 
effects documented by the inventors’ survey fail to translate into increased patenting or 
licensing income. It would seem that inventor royalty shares are not as influential as they could 
be, due to the poor commercial prospects of university inventions. Among other possible 
reasons, these poor prospects appear to reflect the fact that inventors are unable to produce 
potentially licensable inventions, or that eventually TTOs may not be focussing enough on 
commercialising their inventions.   
 
Keywords: patents, IPR, university, knowledge transference 
JEL codes: 034, 031, I23 
  
                                                          
*
 Searle Centre on Law, Regulation and Economic Growth (Northwestern University) and Barcelona 
Institute of Economics (IEB). e-mail: pere.arque@law.northwestern.edu 
†
 ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics and Management, Universidade de Lisboa, UECE – Research Unit 
on Complexity and Economics. e-mail: r.car@sapo.pt 
‡
 University of Barcelona (Department of Public Economics) and Barcelona Institute of Economics (IEB). 
e-mail: jgarciaq@ub.edu 
§
 ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics and Management, Universidade de Lisboa and UECE – Research 
Unit on Complexity and Economics. e-mail: mgodinho@iseg.ulisboa.pt 
1 
 
1. Introduction 
It is well documented that the so-called third mission of universities, namely the transfer 
of knowledge to industry, has real effects on local economic development (Etzkowitz, 
2002; Jaffe, 1989). Such knowledge transfer can be implemented via a number of 
routes, including the hiring of students, sponsored research, licensing, the creation of 
university spin-off firms, or simply via knowledge spillovers (Bercovitz and Feldman, 
2006). In this regard, one mechanism that has become increasingly important for 
researchers and policymakers alike is patent licensing (Geuna and Rossi, 2011; 
Perkmann et al., 2013).1 
 
A question that has aroused considerable interest of late is whether pecuniary incentives 
for inventors are a useful tool for improving licensing outcomes. In the US, as in most 
European countries, university intellectual property policies grant the university control 
of rights over inventions (Sampat et al., 2003; Geuna and Rossi, 2011). The income 
from royalties from inventions is then shared between the inventor and the university, 
according to terms that are generally specified by the university. This naturally allows 
(or even forces) universities to decide which pecuniary incentives, in the form of 
inventor royalty shares, are to be offered to inventors. If inventors care about potential 
royalties, then universities can conveniently set inventor royalty shares in such a way as 
to incentivise their effort.  
 
The purpose of our paper is to investigate the role of inventor royalty shares in 
incentivising scientists’ efforts, and to ultimately provide advice on how to improve 
university patenting and licensing in Portugal and Spain2. Both countries have been 
particularly active over the last few years in developing an appropriate infrastructure for 
improving knowledge transfer (Geuna and Rossi, 2011; Lissoni, 2013; Cartaxo and 
Godinho, 2014). Among the many measures taken, has been the adoption of well-
                                                          
1
 Patenting and licensing are important components of university technology transfer and have been the 
focus of many studies over the last two decades. Verspagen (2006) surveyed the literature on university 
patenting, while Baldini (2006) provided a review of the literature on patenting and licensing in 
universities.   
 
2
 While license income is the main outcome of interest, patents are also useful in the context of this paper. 
Patents are an intermediate input for the generation of license revenues (inventions are patented, and then 
commercialised). It is precisely because patents come first that they might react with a shorter lag to 
variations in royalty sharing. Being able to capture early effects is important in countries such as Portugal 
and Spain, where royalty sharing splits have been set relatively recently. Furthermore, TTOs in both 
Portugal and Spain seem to be using royalty sharing to increase patenting. 
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defined royalty sharing schedules by universities. Are such royalty sharing schedules 
producing the expected effects? The studies to date have presented mixed results 
regarding whether such royalty sharing arrangements are effective in incentivising 
academics’ efforts, suggesting that they might be persuasive in certain institutional 
contexts, but not in others. Portugal and Spain have specific characteristics that make 
them an interesting case. Firstly, university patenting and licensing are recent 
phenomena, which remain at a low rate. Secondly, Technology Transfer Offices (TTOs) 
are relatively young, and are still in an early stage of their learning curve. Thirdly, the 
quality of applied research might not be as high as that in the US.  
 
We build on the analytical framework proposed by Lach and Schankerman (2008) to 
understand the conditions that govern whether inventor royalty shares are likely to be 
effective. Intuitively, higher inventor royalty shares increase the premium for obtaining 
licensable inventions. Scientists are expected to react to this premium by increasing 
their effort in applied research. However, this incentive effect could be diminished if the 
revenues to be shared between the inventor and the university were trivial. Such a 
scenario with trivial royalties could arise if, among other reasons, TTOs were 
ineffective at commercialising good inventions, or if inventors were unable to produce 
inventions with good commercial prospects.  
 
Within this framework, we seek to answer two research questions. First, are inventor 
royalty shares effective in stimulating inventors’ efforts and in improving university 
outcomes? Second, are incentive effects diminished because TTOs are ineffective at 
commercialising inventions, and/or inventors are not good enough at generating 
licensable inventions? In order to empirically answer these research questions we 
employ a mix of objective evidence from university-level data and also subjective 
evidence from new self-collected surveys of TTOs and inventors.  
 
Our paper is related to a vast conceptual and empirical literature that aims to understand 
the motives of academic patenting (Stephan, 1996; Lam, 2011). This literature has 
generally found university inventors to be more strongly motivated by traditional 
reputational and career rewards, rather than by pecuniary incentives. Instead of 
attempting to assess the relative value of the many potentially important motivations of 
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academic patenting, we carry out an in-depth analysis of one such motivation: royalty 
sharing.  
 
Our paper is therefore most closely related to the empirical literature concerned with 
estimating the effectiveness of royalty sharing.3 The papers in this literature typically 
rely either on university-level, or inventor-level datasets. Quite intriguingly, the former 
documents incentive effects, while the latter fail to identify these effects. Two of the 
papers that found positive incentive effects using university level data are those of 
Baldini (2010) and Caldera and Debande (2010). Like us, they too focus on low 
licensing income countries. Our paper however differentiates from theirs and from most 
of the remaining papers in the literature in two important ways. 
 
First, instead of relying just on university or inventor data, we use both. This enables us 
to not only infer incentive effects indirectly, by regressing university outcomes on 
royalty shares, but also to do so in a more direct way, by explicitly asking inventors 
about the effectiveness of royalty shares. To the best of our knowledge, no one has ever 
done so before. Testing for incentive effects with inventor level data is important in 
countries such as Portugal and Spain, where royalty sharing schedules have been set 
relatively recently, and these might have produced incentive effects that have not yet 
translated into increased patenting and licensing. Additionally, inventor-level data 
enables us to understand some of the subtleties that go undetected with university-level 
data alone. For instance, we can infer the percentage of inventors that is already 
incentivised by royalty sharing, that which could be potentially incentivised by higher 
inventor royalty shares, and that which is totally insensitive to royalty sharing. The 
middle group is a potentially interesting target for decision makers. 
 
Second, we not only study the presence or absence of an incentive effect, but also 
whether the conditions necessary for this effect to exist hold. While previous papers 
have studied whether incentive effects are diminished by TTOs’ ineffectiveness at 
commercialising inventions (see Lach and Schankerman, 2008; Belenzon and 
Schankerman, 2009), we are the first to empirically test whether incentive effects are 
also diminished by inventors’ ability to produce licensable inventions. Admittedly, due 
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 This literature is exhaustively surveyed in Table 1, in Section 2.2. 
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to limitations in our data, we are only able to provide tentative evidence of the existence 
of these two potentially important effects. 
 
We obtain three main findings. Firstly, the inventor surveys reveal that one third of 
inventors are incentivised by current royalty sharing schedules (although only a few 
find royalty sharing to be highly influential), one third could be potentially incentivised 
by royalty sharing (if royalty shares were increased, or if scientists have better 
information about royalty sharing), and the remaining third is totally insensitive to 
royalty sharing. Secondly, plain regressions on university level datasets suggest that the 
incentive effects documented by the inventors’ surveys fail to translate into increased 
patenting, or licensing income. Thirdly, both the gatekeeper and ability effects seem to 
diminish royalty sharing incentive effects.   
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the analytical setting and derives 
the research questions of interest. Section 3 offers a review of the institutional context in 
Portugal and Spain, and describes the datasets used in the empirical analysis. Section 4 
empirically answers the research questions posed in Section 2. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Analytical setting and research questions 
In the traditional “Mertonian” world of scientific discovery, the main goal of scientists 
is to establish their priority of discovery by being the first to communicate an advance 
in knowledge. Accordingly, most scientists seem to be motivated by the traditional 
reputational and career rewards that are provided by the scientific community which 
come in the form of eponymy, prizes and publication (Stephan, 1996; Lam, 2011). In 
line with this traditional view, some studies conclude that reputation lies at the heart of 
scientists’ decision to patent.4   
 
While it is widely argued that academics respond to non-pecuniary incentives, recent 
research has sought to determine the extent to which pecuniary incentives also matter. 
Pecuniary incentives are of interest to policymakers as they can be used as a potentially 
effective means of involving scientists, not just in discovery, but also in the transfer of 
the knowledge generated beyond the boundaries of academia (Markman, 2004).  
 
                                                          
4
 See Bodas Freitas and Nuvolari (2012), Göktepe-Hulten and Mahagaonkar (2010), Baldini et al. (2007) 
and Owen-Smith and Powell (2003). 
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In this paper we seek to study the effects of a very specific form of pecuniary incentive: 
the share of royalty income apportioned to university scientists. Higher inventor royalty 
shares secure higher returns for applied research activities that are conducive for 
licensable inventions. Do inventors react to such incentives? Can universities improve 
their technology transfer outcomes by conveniently setting their royalty sharing 
schedules? In what follows, we build on Lach and Schankerman (2008) to understand 
how, and under which conditions, royalty sharing stimulates inventors’ effort.  
  
2.1. Analytical setting 
Basic setup – Lach and Schankerman (2008) develop a simple model that captures the 
dual purpose of scientific research. Scientists derive utility from both scientific 
publications and license revenue.5 Publications can be obtained through basic and 
applied research, whereas license revenue can only be obtained through applied 
research.6 The distinction between basic and applied research imposes a tradeoff 
between the two through the allocation of effort. Policymakers therefore try to shift 
effort from basic to applied research, by making the latter relatively more attractive.  
 
A natural way of increasing the premium of applied research effort in countries under an 
institutional ownership regime –where universities retain control rights over inventions, 
but share the licensing income with the inventor– is by apportioning a larger share of 
royalty income to scientists. Lach and Schankerman (2008) show that, under fairly 
general conditions, scientists’ optimal applied research effort – and in turn the license 
revenue resulting from this optimal applied research effort – is increasing in the 
inventor royalty share.7  
 
                                                          
5
 Note that publications might prove useful not only through increased reputation, but also in the form of 
monetary rewards from tenure, or wage increases that come with promotions. 
6
 Lach and Schankerman (2008) distinguish between two types of applied research: applied research 
devoted to starting new projects, and applied research aimed at improving the quality of each project. For 
expositional clarity we will just refer to applied research.  
7
 This result holds if the diminishing returns to income in the scientist’s utility function are not “too 
strong”. If there is complementarity between basic and applied research efforts, then the results also apply 
to basic research. Lach and Schankerman (2008) show that optimal applied research effort is also 
increasing in the TTO’s effectiveness at commercialising inventions. We abstract from this second result. 
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Interaction effects – The extent to which scientists react to variations in royalty sharing 
critically depends on two policy parameters: TTO’s effectiveness at commercialising 
inventions, and scientist’s ability to conduct applied research.8    
 
Regarding the first of these policy parameters, increases in inventor royalty share will 
have smaller effects if scientists anticipate that TTOs will do a poor job at 
commercialising their inventions. In the extreme case of a totally incompetent TTO, the 
inventor royalty share will not matter at all. Lach and Schankerman (2008) call this 
interaction between the incentive effect of the inventor royalty share and the 
effectiveness of the TTO the gatekeeper effect. 
  
Regarding the second policy parameter, increases in inventor royalty share will have 
smaller effects if scientists anticipate that, given their applied research skills, their 
inventions will have little commercial success. Scientists will not care about royalty 
sharing at all in the limiting case, where their ability to conduct applied research is so 
low that not even the maximum effort will raise the quality of their inventions above the 
minimum standards required for commercialisation by the TTO. We call this interaction 
between the incentive effect of the inventor royalty share and the ability of the inventor 
to conduct applied research the ability effect.9     
 
Research questions – According to the theoretical predictions in Lach and 
Schankerman (2008), inventor royalty shares should be effective at triggering incentive 
effects. It is this effectiveness that we seek to test empirically. Besides testing for the 
presence of incentive effects, we are also interested in learning the extent to which these 
effects are diminished by the gatekeeper and ability effects. Our research questions of 
interest can be formalised as follows:  
                                                          
8
 When we mention “ability to conduct applied research”, we indeed refer to the capacity to undertake 
applied research that can subsequently be exploited economically by patenting and licensing. We could 
also have used the terms “ability to do relevant or commercially oriented applied research”. 
9
 The ability effect is not explicitly taken into account in Lach and Schankerman (2008), who assume 
scientists to have a sufficiently high level of ability to generate inventions that will be licensed by a TTO 
with some probability. We seek to consider an additional scenario, in which less-able scientists produce 
inventions with no probability of being licensed by a TTO. The ability parameter can be accommodated 
within Lach and Schankerman’s (2008) setting as an interaction with TTOs’ effectiveness at 
commercialising inventions. This implies that license revenue can be diminished, either because the TTO 
is not good at commercialising ideas, or because the inventor is less capable of conducting marketable 
applied research. 
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1. Are inventor royalty shares in Portugal and Spain effective in 
stimulating inventors’ efforts and in improving university outcomes? 
 
2. Are royalty share incentive effects diminished because TTOs are not 
pursuing invention commercialisation with the necessary intensity, 
and/or inventors are bad at generating licensable inventions?  
 
2.2. Literature review 
All the empirical studies that set themselves the objective of answering the first research 
question are summarised in Table 1. We have split the articles, based on two 
dimensions: unit of analysis (university vs. inventor), and type of country (high 
licensing income vs. low licensing income). This division helps identify two somewhat 
conflicting regularities in the literature. First, papers that use universities as the unit of 
analysis are unanimous in finding positive incentive effects, as revealed by the 
sensitivity of licensing income (not so much the number of licenses) to variations in 
royalty shares. Interestingly, this positive incentive effect is present in both high (Group 
A) and low (Group B) licensing income countries. This is puzzling, as the latter group 
of countries – where universities are public and less proactive at recruiting talented 
researchers – should be more exposed to the gatekeeper and ability effects and, 
consequently, less fit for incentive effects. Second, papers using inventors as the unit of 
analysis are equally unanimous in failing to document positive incentive effects of 
royalty shares. Rather, they tend to find reputation to be a much more important 
determinant of involvement in disclosure and patenting. Again, the absence of incentive 
effects in papers based on inventor surveys holds for both high (Group C) and low 
(Group D) licensing countries.  
 
The set of papers that has sought to study our second research question – which 
contextual factors make royalty shares an effective pecuniary incentive? – is smaller. 
Lach and Schankerman (2008) find royalty shares to be more effective in private 
universities, which they show to be more pro-active than public universities at 
commercialising inventions. Similarly, Belenzon and Schankerman (2009) find royalty 
shares to be substantially more effective in universities with TTOs governed by 
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incentive pay systems. Both results can be taken as evidence that the gatekeeper effect 
matters. Walter et al. (2013) find that the extent to which financial incentives are 
effective at stimulating the inventor’s propensity to disclose inventions depends on 
inventor characteristics, such as academic field, or patenting experience. This result 
suggests that the ability effect matters too, with higher ability (at producing licensable 
inventions) scientists being more responsive to pecuniary incentives.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 1] 
 
3. Institutional setting and data 
3.1. Contextual setting 
Institutional ownership – The Portuguese intellectual property law (Código da 
Propriedade Industrial) has no specific reference to university intellectual property. 
Universities have traditionally been the sole proprietors of the inventions generated by 
their faculty, with statutory legislation not foreseeing the participation of faculty in 
licensing revenues. The first explicit university-specific intellectual property rights 
policy with well-delimited inventor royalty shares was not adopted until 1998, at the 
Instituto Superior Técnico. Similar statues were gradually adopted over the following 
decade, with the vast majority of universities operating well-defined royalty sharing 
schemes today.10 
 
Spain was one of the first European countries, together with the United Kingdom and 
Switzerland, to adopt the institutional ownership system (Azagra-Caro, 2011; Geuna 
and Rossi, 2011). The framework for scientific and patenting activities has been well 
defined since the 1980s, which was when the University Reform Law allowed 
university researchers to receive income from contracts with firms, including 
arrangements that led to patents and licensing (Azagra-Caro, 2011).11  
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 The University of Coimbra adopted explicit intellectual property right norms in 2003, and several other 
universities did so between 2005 and 2011.  
11
 In particular, the Spanish Law of Patents (Law 11/1986 of Patents of Inventions and Utility Models) 
gives both universities and researchers an incentive to patent the results of their research. 
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TTOs – Both in Portugal and Spain, the different phases of university patenting, 
ranging from disclosure of inventions to licensing, are managed by Technology 
Transfer Offices (TTOs).  
 
In Portugal, two different types of TTO have coexisted until recently: GAPIs and 
OTICs. The former could be found in universities, technology centres, and business 
associations, while the latter were only active in academic institutions (see Cartaxo and 
Godinho, 2014). Most of the TTOs were created after 2000, usually employing no more 
than two or three staff. GAPIs and OTICs have recently evolved to a single structure in 
each university.12  
 
In Spain, TTOs go by the name of OTRIs (Offices for the Transfer of Research 
Results), and all public universities have one. OTRIs are responsible for the transfer of 
university research through a variety of forms, including spin-off creation, R&D 
projects, patenting and licensing. The first OTRIs were created in 1988, via a public 
policy initiative aimed at promoting co-operation between universities and industry.13 
OTRIs acquired an official character in 1996, and organised themselves into a network 
(known as RedOTRI) in 1997. The number of OTRIs grew substantially after these two 
events. 
 
Royalty sharing schedules – Almost all universities in Portugal and Spain have their 
own regulations for the split of licensing income. The schedules are freely chosen by 
each university, and have to be approved by their respective management bodies. 
Income is generally allocated either to universities or researchers, but on occasions it 
can also be shared with the inventor’s department or research group. The royalty shares 
in force in each university are reported in the corresponding intellectual property rights 
rules of the university. Changes in their values have to be duly notified through changes 
                                                          
12
 GAPIs were created by the Portuguese Patent and Trademark Office (INPI) as from 2000, with the aim 
of promoting the use of intellectual property. OTICs were established as from 2006 by the Innovation 
Agency (AdI). Some GAPIs and OTICs were based on previously existing extension offices. In such 
instances, technology licensing and transfer activities coexist with other tasks (such as mentorship to spin-
offs, training, or research management). These TTOs tend to employ a larger number of staff, but the 
figure of no more than two or three technicians engaged in technology transfer remains valid for most 
universities.  
13
 The 1986 Law for the Promotion and General Coordination of Scientific and Technological Research 
(the “Science Law”), which emphasised the need to promote collaboration in R&D between firms and 
universities, established the foundations for the creation of the first OTRIs. 
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in the intellectual property right statutes. As we explain in more detail below, inventor 
royalty shares tend to concentrate at around 50%, and most universities specified their 
royalty sharing schedules after 2000 (95% in Portugal and 73% in Spain). 
 
Patenting and licensing trends – University patenting is a recent, albeit increasing, 
phenomenon in both countries. In Portugal, the first university patent was not awarded 
until 1998, and the cumulative number of university patents did not reach double figures 
until 2001. This late take-up in university patenting can partially be accounted for by the 
failure of the intellectual property law to explicitly define norms with regard to 
university patenting. Despite the late start, the share of university patents in Portugal 
(over the total number of patents in the country) rose from almost zero in 2000, to more 
than one third in 2009. The only data available on licensing income from Portugal is 
that collected through our survey of TTOs. Only four universities are found to report 
positive licensing income, and the first royalties were not obtained until 2008. This 
suggests that university licensing is still in its infancy in Portugal. 
 
University patenting in Spain was not frequent until the 1990s. Since this date, the 
number of university-owned patents has experienced continuous growth, with the 
number of university patent applications (in the national patent office) rising from 210 
in 2000, to 496 in 2012. At present, patents awarded to universities account for almost 
15% of all patents granted (almost twice the share in 2000). Although the distribution of 
patents is strongly skewed, with some universities being particularly active, patenting is 
not restricted to a specific group of universities, and almost all public universities 
consistently apply for at least one patent per year. Total licensing income (from patented 
and non-patented technologies) has experienced a similar trend, rising from €0.5 million 
in 2000, to €2.5 million in 2011.14  
 
3.2. Data 
In order to study the impact of inventor royalty shares on university technology transfer 
outcomes, we use three self-constructed datasets for each country: a university-level 
dataset, a survey addressed to all Portuguese and Spanish university TTOs, and another 
                                                          
14
 Licensing income from patents seems to account for slightly more than one half of total licensing 
income in Spain. 
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survey of a representative sample of inventors in Portugal and Spain. Each dataset is 
described below.  
 
University-level dataset – This is an unbalanced panel, spanning the years of 2007 to 
2011 (both inclusive) for 15 Portuguese and 39 Spanish universities.15 The sampling 
criterion was to retain all university-years for which all the following variables could be 
observed: inventor royalty shares, the number of patent applications made at the 
respective national offices, licensing income, size and age of the TTOs, faculty size, the 
volume of R&D expenditure (only for Spain), and presence of a science park.16 Most of 
the instances in which we had to discard a university-year were on account of the lack 
of information on outcomes (patents or licensing) or the explanatory variable of interest 
(inventor royalty share). Tables 2 and 3 provide descriptive statistics and definitions for 
each of these variables. 
 
[INSERT TABLES 2 AND 3] 
 
The main outcomes of interest (licensing income and number of patent applications) 
take rather low values, and their distribution is highly skewed across universities. 
Licensing income in Portugal ranges from a minimum of zero, to a maximum of 
€274,000. Average licensing income is slightly above €10,000 per year, but the median 
is indeed zero. Licensing income in Spain ranges from a minimum of zero, to a 
maximum of €600,000. Average licensing income is slightly above €60,000 per year, 
but the median is much lower at €29,600. The average number of annual patent 
applications is around 10 for both Portugal and Spain. This number is also unevenly 
distributed across universities, with the minimum and maximum values ranging from 0 
to 54 in Portugal, and 0 to 72 in Spain. The median number of patent applications is 
slightly below the mean (7.5 in Portugal, and 9 in Spain). 17   
                                                          
15
 We restrict the panel to the period post-2007, as inventor royalty share schedules had not been defined 
in several Portuguese universities before this date.  
16
 The university-level dataset for Portugal contains information on 15 universities, which account for 
97% of university patent applications in the period 2005-2012. The university-level dataset for Spain 
includes information on 39 universities, which represent 83% of the universities holding at least one 
patent, and 89% with positive licensing income in the 2010 Red-OTRI Survey. 
17
 Notice that these numbers are extremely low when compared to the income generated in the US. 
According to Lach and Schankerman (2008), US universities generated, on average, $3.6 (€3) million of 
license income per year during the 1990s, with the top 10% private universities earning, on average, over 
$11.5 (€10) million per year (almost five times more than all the Spanish and Portuguese universities 
together). 
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Inventor royalty shares in Portugal and Spain present similar patterns. Figure 1 plots the 
distribution of royalty shares, with average and median values standing at around 55% 
in both countries. Most universities opt to fix inventor royalty share at between 50% and 
60%, with only a few universities opting for extremely low (around 30%), or high 
(above 70%) royalty shares for inventors.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1] 
 
TTO survey – The main objective of the survey for TTOs was to obtain the exact 
inventor royalty share at each university, the year in which royalty shares were first 
introduced, and whether the shares have experienced significant changes over time. We 
were also interested in understanding the administrative process by which royalty 
sharing schedules were approved at each university, and also the goals each university 
pursued with its specified royalty share. The survey was sent to all Portuguese and 
Spanish TTOs during 2011. The response rate was highly satisfactory. All Portuguese 
TTOs (i.e., 22 TTOs) filled in the survey between June 2011 and April 2012, and 47 
Spanish TTOs did so between January 2011 and December 2012 (an 89% response 
rate).18 
 
Inventors’ survey – The primary goal of the survey was to obtain direct feedback from 
university inventors on the importance of inventor royalty shares. A second goal of the 
survey was to relate the effectiveness of royalty shares in measuring inventor quality.  
 
The target of the survey was all those Portuguese and Spanish inventors that had applied 
for at least one patent between the years 2005 and 2009 (both inclusive) at USPTO, 
EPO, or one of their respective national offices (INPI in Portugal, and OEPM in Spain). 
In order to approximate this target population as closely as possible, we first retained all 
the patent applications (to the aforementioned offices) for which the assignee was a 
Portuguese (555 patent applications), or Spanish (5,148 patent applications) university. 
                                                          
18
 Red-OTRI (the network of Spanish TTOs) included 87 members in its 2010 directory. Most of these 
were ascribed to a university, but some were universities without a TTO, or TTOs ascribed to centres 
other than universities (such as scientific institutes and research centres). Most of the scientific research, 
and virtually all the patents and license income is generated by 53 public universities. Therefore, we sent 
the survey to the TTOs of those universities that constitute our relevant population (47 of which filled it 
out). 
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19
  We then located the email addresses of the inventors of these patent applications 
through personalised Google searches. This yielded 534 email addresses in Portugal, 
and 3,033 in Spain (after dealing with multi-applicant inventors). We invited all the 
university inventors for whom we had an email address to answer an online survey in 
January (Portugal) and November (Spain) 2012. From this we obtained 212 complete 
responses for Portugal, and 606 for Spain (equating to 40% and 20% response rates, 
respectively).  
 
We asked inventors to supply their individual characteristics (field of research, age, 
gender, type of contract with the university, rank and measures of quality), and also 
their opinion on several aspects relating to the effectiveness of royalty shares. Table 4 
reports the descriptive statistics of the inventor characteristics. The results of the 
inventors’ perceptions of the royalty shares are discussed in the next section. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 4] 
 
4. Evidence 
We seek to provide empirical answers below to the two research questions posed in 
Section 2. We first study whether inventor royalty shares are effective at stimulating 
inventors’ efforts. Next, we analyze whether incentive effects are likely to be 
diminished by the gatekeeper or ability effects.  
 
4.1 Do inventor royalty shares have an incentive effect? 
In order to answer this question, we rely on both university and inventor level data. 
University level data allows for an indirect, ex-post analysis of incentive effects. We say 
indirect, as we do not directly test for an increase in inventors’ effort (which is 
unobservable), but rather in the results of this effort, namely patenting or licensing 
income. Ex-post is specified, as the incentive effect must have taken place and be 
translated into an increase in university outcomes for it to be traceable by the 
econometrician. Inventor level data allows for a more direct, but not necessarily ex-post 
analysis, which allows for detecting the existence of incentive effects, even when these 
                                                          
19
 Even though we began gathering patent application data from around 2010-2011, we could only collect 
data on applications filed up to 2009, due to the 18 months lag between application and pre-grant 
publication.  
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have not translated into increased outcomes. This is important in countries, such as 
Portugal and Spain, where royalty sharing schedules have been set relatively recently, 
and might have produced incentive effects that have not yet translated into increased 
patenting and licensing.  
 
4.1.1. Evidence from university-level data 
We adopt the empirical specification put forward by Lach and Schankerman (2008), 
which results from scaling up the scientist license revenue or number of applied 
research projects – both shown to depend on inventor royalty share – to the university 
level. 20 Taking logs, and linearising the university revenue or total number of projects 
yields, the following empirical equation is applied: 
 
itititit uxshareroyaltyinventory ++= βδ  (1) 
 
where i  indexes universities, and t  years. The dependent variable ity  stands for either 
(the log of) university licensing income, or (the log of) the number of university patent 
applications (our proxy for the number of applied research projects).  The matrix of 
controls itx  includes (the log of) faculty size, proxies for the TTO’s effectiveness at 
commercialising inventions, such as the size and age of the TTO; proxies for the 
inventors’ average quality at doing applied research, such as R&D per faculty, and; a 
dummy variable with a value of one if the university has a science park to capture the 
existing links between the university and private companies located nearby. Finally, we 
also rely on pre-sample information on patenting by universities to control for time-
invariant unobserved heterogeneity. The parameter of interest is δ , which captures the 
effect of the inventor royalty share on the corresponding dependent variable. Positive 
values of δ  imply that inventor royalty shares are effective at stimulating inventors’ 
efforts. 
 
                                                          
20
 Lach and Schankerman (2008) show that scientists’ revenue is increasing from their research effort. In 
turn, scientists’ optimal research effort is increasing in the inventor royalty share. Therefore, scientists’ 
revenue is also increasing in the inventor royalty share. Licensing revenue can be scaled up to the 
university level by multiplying the scientist revenue by faculty size.  
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Lach and Schankerman (2008) highlight two sources of unobserved heterogeneity that 
are likely to be correlated with inventor royalty share. Firstly, researchers with greater 
commercial orientation or more valuable inventions may be able to lobby their 
universities for more favorable royalty shares (a reverse causality problem). This does 
not seem to be the case at Portuguese and Spanish universities, according to the survey 
for TTOs.21 Secondly, higher inventor royalty shares may attract more innovation-
oriented faculty (a sorting problem).22 Unlike in the US, the sorting channel is likely to 
play a minor role at Portuguese and Spanish universities, where faculty mobility is 
relatively low.  
 
Although most universities are observed over several years, we are unable to use within 
estimators, as the royalty share displays little variation over time.23 Thus, the incentive 
effect of the royalty share is identified from the cross-sectional variation in the data. We 
follow the common approach of using pre-sample information on patenting to control 
for unobserved heterogeneity. We use clustered-robust standard errors to allow for 
heteroscedasticity, and autocorrelation within universities. Note that our specification is 
almost identical to the one used by Lach and Schankerman (2008), and very similar to 
that of related papers, such as that of Caldera and Debande (2010). 
 
Table 5 shows equation (1) estimates based on the unbalanced panels of Portuguese and 
Spanish universities, as described in Table 1.24 For each country and dependent 
variable, we begin with a parsimonious specification that only includes royalty share, 
pre-sample information on patenting by universities, and time dummies (columns 1, 3, 5 
and 7). The coefficient associated with the inventor’s royalty share is only found to be 
                                                          
21
 The TTO survey suggests that inventors play a marginal role in the fixing of royalty shares, both at 
Portuguese and Spanish universities. Royalty share was a unilateral proposal from the Governing Council 
in 41% and 64% of Portuguese and Spanish universities, respectively, with no participation of the 
researchers. In about a third of the universities in both countries, royalty share was discussed in the 
Research Commission, with researchers being given the opportunity to influence the final decision. Only 
in 32% of Portuguese, and 2% of Spanish universities did the researchers play a more active role in 
royalty share decision. 
22
 In this case, the estimated δ would be an upward biased estimate of the pure effort component of the 
royalty shares, but it would remain a consistent estimate of the overall incentive effect (including both the 
effort and sorting components). 
23
 Only 14% of Portuguese TTOs, and 20% of the Spanish TTOs surveyed claimed to have changed the 
royalty shares over time. However, only four of these changes took place during the sample years selected 
for the econometric analysis in Spain, and three in Portugal. 
24
 These panels only include universities for which all the relevant explanatory variables were available at 
some point in time (15 Portuguese, and 39 Spanish universities). We experimented with a simpler 
specification, with fewer explanatory variables (royalty shares, pre-sample patenting and time dummies) 
which allowed for broader panels, but the results remained unchanged.     
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significantly different from zero, though at a 10% level, in column (3). Next we expand 
this specification with the explanatory variables discussed above (columns 2, 4, 6 and 
8). The coefficient associated with inventor’s royalty share is insignificantly different 
from zero in all cases, except in Column (6), where it is only significant at the 10% 
level. This set of results suggests that royalty shares play a negligible role in stimulating 
patenting and license income at university level in Portugal and Spain. As for the other 
regressors, the pre-sample average number of patent applications is significant in most 
of the regressions. This implies that this variable controls, at least in part, unobserved 
heterogeneity. The remaining explanatory variables are mainly insignificant. The 
amount of experience accumulated by the TTO seems to positively affect patenting in 
Portugal, while faculty size and R&D intensity is positively correlated with patenting in 
Spain.   
 
Somewhat surprisingly, our results do not agree with those obtained by Caldera and 
Debande (2010), who find license revenue to be positively affected by inventor royalty 
shares in Spain. This discrepancy is entirely driven by two universities, which 
introduced substantial changes in their royalty sharing schedules between the periods 
2001-2005 (the period analysed by Caldera and Debande, 2010), and 2007-2011 (the 
period analysed in our paper).25 When we drop these two universities from the sample, 
we can indeed replicate Caldera and Debande’s (2010) results (see Table 1A in the 
Appendix). Our interpretation of the reversal of Caldera and Debande’s (2010) results 
goes as follows - the change in the royalty sharing schedules of two universities add 
within variation in the data, and, whereas the inventor royalty rates in these two 
universities increased very drastically, their patenting and licensing outcomes did not. 
As a result, the incentive effect becomes insignificant.  
 
 [INSERT TABLE 5] 
 
4.1.2. Evidence from inventor-level data 
Direct feedback from the inventors’ survey is reported in Table 6. Inventors seem to be 
strikingly unaware of the royalty shares in force at their universities (see Question 1). 
                                                          
25
 These two universities are the University of Cádiz, and the University of Extremadura. The first raised 
the inventor royalty share from 50% to 90% in 2007. The second one defined its royalty sharing schedule 
in 2005, with a very generous 80% inventor royalty share.   
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However, most of the inventors who are aware of royalty share values claim to be 
incentivised by royalty sharing, with a relatively small percentage of inventors being 
highly influenced by royalty sharing (see question 2). Interestingly, most of the 
inventors who are either unaware of the royalties, or who are aware of them, but are not 
influenced by the current royalty schedules, state that there is a minimum inventor 
royalty share threshold that would trigger their effort (see question 3). Surprisingly, the 
average value of this threshold is below the average value of the inventor royalty shares 
in force (see question 4).26   
 
[INSERT TABLE 6] 
 
Figure 2 splits the respondents, based on whether they are sensitive, or not, to royalty 
sharing, and on whether they are incentivised, or not, by the royalty sharing schemes in 
force. Around 33% of the respondents in Portugal and Spain are totally insensitive to 
royalty sharing, meaning that they would not increase their effort for any value of 
inventor royalty shares, whereas the remaining 67% of inventors is sensitive to royalty 
sharing. Regarding this last group, 33% (19%) of inventors in Portugal (Spain) are 
already incentivised by royalty sharing, with royalties having a varying degree of 
importance for them. Importantly, 34% (48%) of the sensitive inventors in Portugal 
(Spain) are not incentivised by royalty sharing at present, but would be for higher 
inventor royalty shares. The vast majority of the inventors in this last group is unaware 
of the current royalty sharing schedules. This means that TTOs could perhaps achieve 
better outcomes by providing updated information to scientists on the current inventor 
royalty share values.27   
 
[INSERT FIGURE 2] 
 
The results in this section are interesting for three reasons. Firstly, the fact that incentive 
effects arise for only about one third of respondents means that most inventors are 
                                                          
26
 This last point is entirely driven by ‘unaware’ inventors, who set the “effort” threshold lower than the 
threshold set by ‘aware’ (but uninfluenced) inventors. 
27
 Notice that many of the inventors in the last group (i.e. could be incentivised, but are uninformed) 
provide effort thresholds (royalty thresholds above which it would be worthwhile to increase their effort) 
below the royalty shares in force at their universities (see Table 6, row 4.3). This reinforces the perception 
that improved information practices about royalty sharing could be particularly effective.  
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driven by motives other than royalty sharing when engaging in patenting activities.28 
Secondly, inventor-level data reveals that royalty sharing does incentivise the effort of 
some researchers, while university-level data suggests that this incentivised effort fails 
to translate into increased patenting, or licensing (at least in Portugal). Thirdly, the 
finding that a relatively small percentage of inventors are incentivised by royalty 
sharing helps explain the discrepancy in the results obtained by papers using university 
vs. inventor level data: inventor-level studies, which tend to average over inventors, find 
no incentive effects, as the average inventor is indeed not motivated by royalty sharing; 
however, the effort triggered in the few incentivised inventors might result in increased 
licensing revenue for the university (though this university level effect is not robust in 
our paper).   
 
4.2. Could the current royalty sharing schedules be more effective? 
Figure 2 shows that most inventors are sensitive to royalty sharing. However, only a 
few of these sensitive inventors find royalty sharing to be highly influential. Why do 
royalty shares matter relatively little for those inventors who are sensitive to them? 
Below, we discuss the extent to which the gatekeeper or the ability effects might be 
diminishing the incentive effects of royalty shares.  
 
TTOs’ gatekeeper effect – As in most European countries, Spanish and Portuguese 
universities retain ownership of intellectual property rights, with the commercialisation 
of inventions depending ultimately on TTOs. This means that inventors’ licensing 
revenues are largely dependent on the ability of TTOs to find licensees and to negotiate 
agreements. As discussed in the analytical setting, a possible reason for royalty shares 
having a smaller incentive effect, or no effect at all, is that the TTO is not pursuing 
invention commercialisation with the necessary intensity. Does the TTOs’ inability to 
successfully commercialise inventions account for the ineffectiveness of royalty shares? 
 
A formal method of empirically testing for the gatekeeper effect in the US has involved 
exploiting the fact that private universities are more aggressive than their public 
                                                          
28
 Several papers find reputation to be the main motive for scientist’s involvement in patenting (e.g. 
Göktepe-Hulten and Mahagaonkar, 2010; Baldini et al. 2007). Scientists might also be able to 
commercially exploit patents without necessarily licensing them (i.e. through spin-off creation, or R&D 
contracts). 
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counterparts in their licensing strategies.29 This strategy, however, cannot be 
implemented in Europe, where the bulk of universities performing scientific research 
are public.30 We have to rely on qualitative information derived from the surveys. We 
explicitly asked the TTOs to identify the outcomes pursued via their royalty sharing 
schemes.  
 
The results to this question are reported in Table 7. Interestingly, most of the TTOs 
claim to use royalty shares to incentivise university patenting and to improve their 
scientific production. However, they are relatively uninterested in using royalty sharing 
to maximise licensing income – less than a third mentioned being interested in 
maximising total licensing revenue (27% in Portugal, and 31% in Spain), or TTO 
revenue (9% in Portugal, and 5% in Spain). This lack of interest in generating licensing 
income anticipates poor commercialisation perspectives for inventions. This perception 
was backed up by comments from several respondents to the inventors’ survey, pointing 
out the inability of their TTO to commercialise inventions as the main reason for not 
caring about royalty sharing. The general feeling is perhaps best captured in the 
following words of one scientist: “who cares about getting 100% of nothing?” 
  
Overall, the feedback from the surveys is consistent with the econometric results 
reported in Table 5, where the proxies for the quality of the TTO at commercialising 
inventions (i.e., the size and age of the TTO) are generally found not to be significant 
(with only age having a positive effect on patenting in Portugal). 
 
[INSERT TABLE 7] 
 
Inventors’ ability effect – Inventors would certainly not respond to royalty incentives 
if their ability to perform applied research was such that their chances of producing 
licensable inventions were non-existent. We use the inventors’ survey to determine 
whether inventors capable of producing high quality research are better informed about 
                                                          
29
 This is the strategy adopted by Lach and Schankerman (2008). Belenzon and Schankerman (2009) 
report that private universities are more likely to adopt incentive pay. In contrast, public universities tend 
to care more about local development objectives, and often prefer to offer licenses to local start-up 
companies (at the expense of foregone license income). 
30
 Belenzon and Schankerman (2009) find that TTOs adopting incentive pay have between 30-40 percent 
more income per license. This effect is robust to differences in university ownership. We sought to 
implement this strategy but, unfortunately, almost none of the universities in our sample adopt incentive 
pay. 
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royalty shares and more sensitive to the value of these shares. We construct two 
dependent variables based on the results reported in Table 6: a dummy variable with a 
value of one if inventors are aware of the royalty share, and zero otherwise; and a 
dummy variable with a value of one if inventors consider the royalty share to have a 
high or medium influence on their efforts to be inventive, and zero otherwise. We 
regress these two variables on three measures of inventor quality: whether the inventor’s 
patents were filed in patent offices abroad; the number sexenios31 earned by the 
scientists, and; whether the inventor holds the title of ‘professor’, or not. Only the last 
indicator of quality is available for Portugal, and thus the results presented in this 
section are largely based on evidence from Spain. The results are reported in Table 8. In 
all cases, we control for gender, age, and a full set of university and field fixed effects.   
 
In columns (1) and (5), our proxy for quality in applied research is a dummy variable 
with a value of one if the inventor’s patent was filed at the USPTO or the EPO between 
2005 and 2009, and zero if it was only filed at the national office (our preferred proxy). 
Inventors with patent applications abroad have a significantly higher degree of 
awareness of royalty shares, but they do not seem to find them to be more important for 
incentivising their research efforts. In the other columns, we use a set of variables that 
proxy a more generic type of quality: a set of dummy variables representing the 
different number of sexenios earned by a scholar (columns 2 and 6), and a dummy 
variable with a value of one if the inventor holds the title of ‘professor’ (columns 3 and 
7). Neither of these variables seems to explain different attitudes towards royalty shares. 
If anything, inventors with four sexenios seem to be slightly more aware of royalty 
shares than inventors with no sexenios (but only at the 10% significance level). Finally, 
the results remain stable when all the variables are included simultaneously in the 
regression in columns (4) and (8). Interestingly, there are significant gender differences 
for the degree of awareness of royalty shares.  
 
The finding that inventors with international patent applications are substantially more 
aware of the royalties is of particular interest, as it suggests that only high quality 
                                                          
31
 Sexenios are a supplement to a researcher’s salary awarded following evaluation by a national agency 
(CNEAI, National Commission for the Evaluation of Research Activity). This evaluation gives 
substantial weight to publications in international journals listed in the ISI’s Journal Citation Reports. In 
the Spanish research system, sexenios are seen as evidence of scientific excellence, and their use has had 
positive effects on Spain’s scientific production (see Jiménez-Contreras et al., 2003). 
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patents with a good chance of being licensed provoke inventors’ curiosity for learning 
about royalty sharing. However, as Table 4 shows, the percentage of inventors with 
patent applications abroad in our sample is extremely low (below 10%), which indicates 
that most inventors are producing patents with little commercial value and, hence, 
royalty share does not matter much to them. All in all, it appears that pecuniary 
incentives would matter more if patents were registered in patent offices abroad.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 8] 
 
5. Conclusions 
The first research question that we have investigated in this paper is whether inventor 
royalty shares serve as an effective pecuniary incentive at Portuguese and Spanish 
universities. Evidence from a new inventors’ survey indicates that one third of patent 
applicants are incentivised by current royalty sharing schedules, one third would be 
incentivised by higher royalty shares, and that the remaining third is totally insensitive 
to royalty sharing. However, plain regressions on university level datasets suggest that 
the incentive effects documented by the inventors’ survey fail to translate into increased 
patenting or licensing income. 
 
The second research question that we have sought to answer is whether incentive effects 
are diminished by environmental factors. While most inventors are sensitive to royalty 
sharing, only a few find royalty sharing to be highly influential. Why do royalty shares 
matter relatively little for those who are sensitive to them? It would seem that inventor 
royalty shares are not as influential as they could be on account of the poor commercial 
prospects of university inventions. Two possible reasons can be put forward to account 
for these poor expectations.  
 
Firstly, TTOs may not be sufficiently focussed on commercialising inventions. It should 
be stressed that in Portugal, as in Spain, research universities are overwhelmingly public 
and that their TTOs eventually lack a clear commercial orientation. Indeed, in Portugal, 
some TTOs claim to be much more concerned with regional development and the 
boosting of local entrepreneurship through university spin-offs, than in licensing 
revenue (see Cartaxo and Godinho, 2014). In some cases, royalty-free licenses are 
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offered to local firms simply to maximise the chances of university-generated 
knowledge being diffused among local economic agents. A further potential explanation 
for their lack of interest in maximising licensing income is that TTOs can rely on other 
sources of financing, including university funds, revenues from training, and consulting 
services, and also overheads charged to researchers from European projects.32 Our 
surveys for TTOs reflect this lack of interest in licensing income. Surprisingly, royalty 
sharing schemes seek to maximise the number of patents, and not the amount of 
licensing revenues, as one might expect. This suggests that TTOs fail to fully 
understand that royalty sharing can serve as an incentive by providing enhanced revenue 
opportunities for researchers. A line of future research could thus be to explore this 
apparently poor performance, researching on why the action of these TTOs seems not to 
be concentrated on licensing revenue, thus favouring other priorities and strategies as an 
alternative.  
 
Secondly, many inventors seem to be failing to produce licensable inventions. Inventors 
whose patents were filed abroad (arguably higher quality patents) seem to care more 
about royalty sharing. However, only a few university inventions in Portugal and Spain 
were granted patents abroad. While the number of university patents in Portugal and 
Spain has grown dramatically in recent years, the quality of these patents might not yet 
be good enough to generate licensing income. It appears that in both countries, 
inventors are more interested in obtaining patents to enhance their reputation, and then 
in exploiting this reputation premium to foster technology transfer through R&D 
partnerships with industry. Another possibility could be that patents are used to 
strengthen technology transfer through the creation of spin-off firms. In neither of these 
cases would patenting be related to licensing. These results imply the need to develop 
further studies to research to what extent these effects are taking place, and whether a 
trade-off may actually be happening between licensing and the creation of spin-off 
firms.  
 
                                                          
32
 We should add that most TTOs, particularly those in Portugal, but also in Spain, are small, and still at a 
very early stage of the learning curve. However, over the last few years, the patenting policies of some 
TTOs have shifted from a “quantity”, to a “quality” strategy. Indeed, a number of TTOs now seem to be 
more commercially aware of their licensing activities, and have attained a critical scale whereby they can 
successfully license their universities’ patents.  
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Clearly, a further explanation for the absence of any incentive effects attributable to 
royalty sharing could be that university scientists are disproportionately driven by 
traditional academic motivations (i.e., eponymy, prizes and publication). Despite this 
argument having been taken into account by our analytical model, it has not been 
empirically tested in this paper. Indeed, it should be stressed that in Portugal and Spain 
alike, more importance has traditionally been attached to academic activities, such as 
publishing, for obtaining tenure and other career promotions, than to patents or 
licensing. Thus, classic academic incentives can be said to impose a lower importance 
for the pay-off from commercially-oriented research: scientists will only devote effort to 
producing commercially-oriented inventions if the expected gains from so doing are 
greater than the gains from producing publications (i.e., the possibility of obtaining 
tenured positions, promotions, and eventually wage increases). 
 
Other explanations for our results, which could also be explored by future research, 
include the appropriability regime of the technologies developed by university inventors 
and the possible geographical effects. Some highly valuable technologies produced by 
university inventors might not be adequately protected by patents. Unpatented 
technologies, for which property rights are not well delimited, are more difficult to be 
exchanged in the marketplace through licensing. But even if university technologies 
were suitable for patent protection, geographical effects could be a limiting factor for 
their commercialisation. TTOs belonging to smaller universities may lack the capacity 
to negotiate licenses with potential customers located much beyond the university’s 
region, even when using the services of technology brokers. The impossibility to reach 
global markets would considerably restrict the potential set of licensees to local, mainly 
low-tech, firms. Moreover, in future studies it could be interesting to assess whether the 
emphasis of some TTOs on regional technology transfer might have a higher social 
return than the alternative of focussing mostly on licensing to external licensees. 
 
Our paper has policy implications. Most inventors have been found to care about 
royalty sharing. However, in practice, only a few of such sensitive inventors are highly 
influenced by royalty sharing. Hence, it would seem that royalty sharing has the 
potential for achieving much stronger incentive effects. Understanding how to unfold 
this potential is of primary policy interest. Three courses of action can be taken. First, 
most of the inventors that have been defined as being sensitive, but non-incentivised, 
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are unaware of the royalty sharing schedules in force. The minimum threshold value for 
which these inventors would be willing to increase their effort is often equal, or below 
current inventor royalty shares. So a good starting point would consist of informing 
inventors about royalty sharing. Second, both TTOs and inventors need to acquire 
greater commercial orientation, in order to ensure that the licensing income being 
shared is non-trivial. TTOs would have to commit themselves to pro-active 
commercialisation practices, including searching for licensees, and not just encouraging 
invention disclosure and undertaking the ensuing administrative tasks. Given that most 
Portuguese and Spanish firms are not technology-based, the demand for licenses is 
primarily from abroad, which means a successful licensing strategy would require the 
specific targeting of international licensees. Similarly, scientists will have to become 
more commercially-oriented. In other words, scientists need to be able to produce 
inventions that can be economically exploited through patenting and licensing. Third, 
most TTOs in Portugal and Spain are rather small, and it is very hard for each to have 
the full expertise needed to successfully explore their patent portfolios. A possibility to 
consider, is the stimulation of the merger of TTOs to build critical mass, or at least to 
enhance their coordination to target international licensees. 
 
However, it is not our wish to overstate the policy implications, as it might simply not 
be optimal from a welfare viewpoint to maximise licensing income. Indeed, universities 
in Spain and Portugal are public and, as such, are likely to prioritise other goals. For 
instance, they might prefer to maximise regional development, for which there are 
forms of technology transfer, such as spin-off creation and R&D cooperation 
agreements which are likely to better serve this purpose. Spin-offs, for example, tend to 
be located in the same region as the university from which they emerge, thereby 
guaranteeing regional development (Zhang, 2009; Zucker et al., 1998). Licensing, on 
the other hand, only spurs regional development if inventions are licensed to local 
licensees, which might be at odds with maximising licensing income.33 Moreover, 
universities might prefer their researchers to commit to academic research, as they may 
perceive this to be a greater source of spillovers than commercially-oriented research. 
 
                                                          
33
 Belenzon and Schankerman (2009) find that public universities with strong local development 
objectives see their licensing income reduced, as they prefer to license to local firms (even if it is at a 
discount). 
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The apparent lack of interest shown by Portuguese and Spanish universities in licensing 
income might therefore be totally legitimate. However, TTOs in both countries do use 
royalty sharing schemes to improve technology transfer. It is perhaps this coexistence of 
royalty sharing policies and the lack of interest in licensing income that is somewhat 
puzzling, as royalty sharing is most effective when combined with a credible 
commitment to commercialisation. 
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Figure 1. Distribution of inventor royalty shares in Portugal and Spain 
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Figure 2. Sensitive and incentivized inventors. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The percentages in this figure are calculated with information provided in Table 6. Percentages are always with respect to 
the total number of respondents and they are based on the following definitions are calculations: 
Insensitive to royalty sharing: respondents that do not (or would not) react to any value of the inventor royalty share. 
Consistently with this definition, the percentage of respondents that are insensitive to royalty sharing is obtained by dividing the 
number of “no” in question 3 over the total number of respondents in the survey (0.49*141/212 in Portugal and 0.41*492/606 in 
Spain).  
Sensitive to royalty sharing: respondents that (would) react to sufficiently large values of the inventor royalty share. Following 
this definition, the percentage of respondents that are sensitive to royalty sharing is obtained as 1 - % of respondents insensitive to 
royalty sharing.  
Incentivized by the current inventor royalty shares: respondents who state that royalty shares have had a “high”, “medium” or 
“low” influence on their decision to generate patentable inventions. Consistent with this definition, we obtain the percentage of 
respondents incentivized by the current inventor royalty shares by multiplying the percentage of “yes” in question 1 by the sum of 
the percentage of “high”, “medium” and “low” in question 2 (48%*(14%+28%+28%) in Portugal and 28%*(11%+23%+34%) in 
Spain). Similarly, we obtain the percentage of inventors that are highly, moderately and barely incentivized by multiplying the 
percentage of “yes” in question 1 by the percentage of “high”, “medium” and “low” in question 2 respectively.  
Could be incentivized by a higher inventor royalty share: respondents who are not incentivized by the current royalty shares, 
but who state that there is an inventor royalty share for which they would be willing to increase their effort. Consequently, we 
have calculated the percentage of  respondents that could be incentivized by a higher inventor royalty share by dividing the 
number of “yes” in question 3 by the total number of respondents in the survey (0.51*141/212 in Portugal and 0.59*492/606 in 
Spain). Notice that the pool of sensitive respondents that could be incentivized is formed by two subgroups: a very small group of 
respondents who are aware of the royalty shares (answer “none” in question 2 and “yes” in question 3) and a large group of 
inventors who are not aware of the current royalty shares (answer “no” in question 1 and “yes” in question 3).
All respondents 
Insensitive to royalty sharing  
• 33% in Portugal 
• 33% in Spain 
Sensitive to royalty sharing  
• 67% in Portugal 
• 67% in Spain 
Incentivized by the current 
inventor royalty shares 
• 33% in Portugal 
• 19% in Spain 
Could be incentivized by a 
higher inventor royalty share 
• 34% in Portugal 
• 48% in Spain 
Highly incentivized 
• 7% in Portugal 
• 3% in Spain 
Moderately incentivized 
• 13% in Portugal 
• 6% in Spain 
 
Barely incentivized 
• 13% in Portugal 
• 10% in Spain 
Informed about current 
royalty sharing 
• 2% in Portugal 
• 3% in Spain 
 
Uninformed about current 
royalty sharing 
• 32% in Portugal 
• 45% in Spain 
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TABLES 
Table 1. Literature review 
Paper Data and sources 
Country and 
years 
Dependent 
variable 
Explanatory 
variable Findings 
 
GROUP A. Unit of analysis: university / Type of country: high licensing income 
Friedman and 
Silberman 
(2003) 
Panel of universities. 
Sources: AUTM Licensing 
Survey; National Research 
Council. 
US, 1997-
1999 
Number of 
licenses and 
licensing income 
Royalty share (1) No effect on number 
of licenses; (2) Positive 
effect on licensing 
income 
Markman et al. 
(2004) 
Cross-section of universities. 
Sources: AUTM Licensing 
Survey; own survey to UTTO 
directors; web-based searches; 
USPTO. 
US, 1999 Number of 
equity licenses 
Royalty share (1) Negative effect 
Link and Siegel 
(2005) 
Panel of universities. 
Sources: Own field interviews to 
entrepreneurs, administrators 
and scientists from five 
universities; AUTM Licensing 
Survey. 
US, 1991-
1998 
Number of 
licenses and 
licensing income 
Royalty share (1) Positive effect 
Lach and 
Schankerman 
(2008) 
Panel of universities. 
Sources: AUTM Licensing 
Survey; own survey to TLOs. 
US, 1997-
1999 
Licensing 
income 
Royalty share (1) Positive effect 
Belenzon and 
Schankerman 
(2009) 
Panel of universities. 
Sources: Own survey to TLOs; 
AUTM Licensing Survey; patent 
data from the USPTO. 
US, 1995-
2005 
Income per 
license 
Performance 
pay in TTO 
(1) Positive effect 
 
GROUP B. Unit of analysis: university / Type of country: low licensing income 
Baldini (2010) Panel of universities.  
Source: Italian Ministry of 
Education and PATUNIT 
database 
Italy, 1998-
2002 
Patent counts Royalty share (1) Positive effect 
Caldera and 
Debande (2010) 
Panel of universities.  
Source: Spanish TTO Network 
(RedOTRI) Survey 
Spain, 2001-
2005 
Number of 
licenses and 
licensing income 
Royalty share (1) No effect on number 
of licenses; (2) Positive 
effect on licensing 
income 
 
GROUP C. Unit of analysis: inventor / Type of country: high licensing income 
Sauermann et al. 
(2010) 
Cross section of doctorate 
recipients.  
Sources: Survey of Doctorate 
Recipients (National Science 
Foundation); AUTM Licensing 
Survey; National Research 
Council 
US, 2003 Involvement in patenting 
Royalty share 
and salary 
(1) No effect of inventor 
royalty share; (2) 
Positive effect of salary 
in Physical Sciences but 
not in Life Sciences and 
Engineering. 
Göktepe and 
Mahagaonkar 
(2010) 
Cross-section of scientists. 
Source: Max Planck Society 
survey on the commercial 
activities of 2,500 scientists 
affiliated to 67 institutes 
Germany, 
2007 
Involvement in 
disclosure and 
patenting 
Monetary and 
reputation 
expectations 
(1) Expectation of 
financial benefits is not 
important; (2) 
expectation to increase 
reputation is important. 
 
GROUP D: Unit of analysis: inventor / Type of country: low licensing income 
Baldini et al. 
(2007) 
Cross-section of university 
inventors.  
Source: own survey to university 
inventors. 
Italy, 2003 Involvement in patenting 
Personal 
earnings 
(1) Personal earnings do 
not represent a main 
incentive; (2) Reputation 
matters.  
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
 Portugal  Spain 
 Mean S.D. Min Max  Mean S.D. Min Max 
          
 License revenue regression 
 (N=7, N*T=29)  (N=39, N*T=155) 
          
License income (in thousands of Euros) 10.27 50.82 0 274  66.32 99.59 0 600 
Royalty share 55.00 7.93 50 80  53.87 10.71 33 90 
Pre-sample patent applications 10.96 17.68 1 49  8.20 8.06 1 36 
Size of TTO 5.20 2.88 1 9  17.31 15.71 3 83 
Age of TTO in 2007 5.37 3.31 0 11  15.95 3.52 4 20 
Faculty size 991 462 424 1,924  2,812 4,565 546 40,879 
R&D (in thousands of Euros) na na na na  33,243 25,676 3,825 119,000 
Science park dummy variable 0.79 0.41 0 1  0.69 0.46 0 1 
          
 Patent application regression 
 (N=15, N*T=56)  (N=39, N*T=188) 
          
Patent applications 9.52 10.06 0 54  11.95 11.47 0 72 
Royalty share 54.82 8.89 30 80  53.67 11.43 33 90 
Pre-sample patent applications 9.24 13.22 0 49  7.74 7.66 1 36 
Size of TTO 4.47 2.80 1 9  16.35 14.96 3 83 
Age of TTO in 2007 5.20 4.77 0 17  15.74 3.65 4 20 
Faculty size 961 417 424 1924  2,617 4,192 546 40,879 
R&D (in thousands of Euros) na na na na  31,225 24,627 2,575 119,000 
Science park dummy variable 0.64 0.48 0 1  0.69 0.46 0 1 
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Table 3. Variable definitions and sources   
Variable Definition Source Portugal Source Spain 
Licensing income (in 
thousands of Euros) 
Total licensing income of the university in thousands of 
Euros. It includes income not only from patents but also 
from other sources such as software, databases or know-
how. In Spain, licensing income from patents is only 
observed from 2009 onwards and accounted, on average, 
for 37, 63 and 58% of total licensing income in the years 
2009, 2010 and 2011 respectively. 
Survey to TTOs Red OTRI Surveys1 
Patent applications Number of patent applications in the national offices Portuguese patent office Spanish patent and 
trademark office 
Inventor royalty share Share of license revenues that goes to the inventor as 
established in the royalty sharing scheme of the university 
Survey to TTOs Survey to TTOs and 
tables in González-
Albo-Manglano and 
Zulueta-García (2007)2 
Pre-sample patent 
applications 
Average number of patent applications in the national 
office in the years 2005 and 2006 
Portuguese patent office Spanish patent and 
trademark office 
Size of TTO Number of  workers in the TTO that have a technical 
profile 
2008 Survey to TTOs Red OTRI Surveys1 
Age of TTO in 2007 Age of the TTO in 2007  2008 Survey to TTOs Red OTRI Surveys1  
Faculty size Number of researchers in the university (in Spain this 
corresponds to the PDI categories described in the 
LOMLOU) 
http://w3.dgeec.mec.pt/rebides/20XX/ Red OTRI Surveys1 
R&D (in thousands of 
Euros) 
Total amount of research support committed to the 
university through programs for financing public research 
na Red OTRI Surveys1 
Science park dummy 
variable 
A dummy variable with value one if the university has a 
science park. 
Own elaboration via internet searches 
and phone calls to universities 
Red OTRI Surveys1 
Notes: 1. http://www.crue.org/Publicaciones/Paginas/Informe-RedOTRI.aspx?Mobile=0; 2. The tables with the royalty shares can be found in 
http://www.scielo.br/pdf/ci/v36n1/a05v36n1.pdf. 
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Table 4. Inventors’ characteristics (from the inventors’ survey) 
  Portugal  Spain 
  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D. 
Age 46.89 8.52  46.39 9.27 
Male 0.71   0.77  
Permanent contract 0.54   0.82  
Position      
 PhD student 0.00   0.04  
 Postdoc 0.02   0.08  
 Assistant professor  0.43   0.09  
 Associate professor 0.37   0.51  
 Professor 0.17   0.29  
Number of “sexenios”a na   2.15 1.69 
International patent applicationsa na   0.09  
Field      
 
Architecture 0.01   0.02  
 
Biologya na   0.06  
 
Chemistry 0.05   0.14  
 
Engineering 0.47   0.37  
 
Medicine 0.03   0.05  
 
Pharmacyb 0.05   0.04  
 
Physicsa na   0.07  
 
Science and Technologyb 0.27   na  
 
Technology and Management 0.02   na  
 
Telecomunications na   0.06  
 
Other 0.10   0.19  
Notes: The statistics for Portugal are based on the 212 responses for which we have full 
information. The statistics for Spain are based on the 606 responses for which we have full 
information except for the variable “International patent applications” for which we only have 
information for 573 researchers. The variable “International patent applications” is a dummy 
variable with value one if the inventor has international patent applications (in the USPTO and 
EPO offices) and zero otherwise. This was not obtained directly from the survey but from 
matching the survey with the original database on patents retrieved from the patent offices. All 
the variables are dummy variables except for “Age” and “Number of sexenios” and we only 
report standard deviations for these last two variables. a) The number of “Sexenios” is a 
recognition awarded to Spanish scholars that does not exist in Portugal (see footnote 23 for fuller 
explanation), the number of international patent applications by scientist is available for Spain 
but not for Portugal, the fields “Biology” and “Physics” are specific to the Spanish survey. b) 
The fields “Science and Technology” and “Technology and Management” are specific to the 
Portuguese survey. 
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Table 5. License revenue, patent applications and inventor royalty shares 
 Portugal  Spain 
 Patent applications  License revenue  Patent applications  License revenue 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
Royalty share 0.00 -0.01  0.05* 0.03  0.01 0.01*  0.01 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02) (0.02)  (0.01) (0.00)  (0.02) (0.02) 
log(Pre-sample patent applications) 0.53*** 0.28  -0.21 1.65  0.78*** 0.58***  0.88*** 0.28 
 (0.14) (0.17)  (0.25) (2.57)  (0.07) (0.10)  (0.25) (0.35) 
log(TTO/Faculty)  -0.36*   -9.98   0.10   0.17 
  (0.20)   (9.02)   (0.08)   (0.39) 
Age TTO  0.26**   4.12   0.03   -0.04 
  (0.12)   (4.06)   (0.06)   (0.25) 
Age TTO squared  -0.01*   -0.49   -0.00   0.00 
  (0.01)   (0.51)   (0.00)   (0.01) 
log(Faculty)  -0.12   -10.45   0.41**   0.63 
  (0.25)   (11.39)   (0.16)   (0.39) 
log(R&D/Faculty)        0.23*   0.51 
        (0.13)   (0.39) 
Science park dummy variable  -0.33   -0.83   0.05   -0.00 
  (0.42)   (0.49)   (0.12)   (0.47) 
Constant 0.72 0.09  -2.21* 16.29  0.12 -6.10**  1.15 -10.53 
 (1.07) (1.90)  (0.87) (23.60)  (0.28) (2.96)  (0.92) (8.80) 
            
Observations 56 56  29 29  188 188  155 155 
Universities 15 15  7 7  39 39  39 39 
R-squared 0.34 0.45  0.28 0.48  0.66 0.71  0.24 0.34 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Clustered (by university) robust 
standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is the log of one plus the number of patent applications and total license 
revenue. All the regressions include a full set of time dummies.  
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Table 6. Inventors’ opinions on the effectiveness of the royalty shares 
     
  Portugal  Spain 
1) Do you know what the inventor royalty share is in your university? 
Yes (%) 48  28 
No (%) 52  72 
# Respondents 212  606 
    
2) What is the influence of the inventor royalty share on your decision to generate 
patentable inventions? (Addressed to respondents who answer “yes” to question 1) 
High (%) 14  11 
Medium (%) 28  23 
Low (%) 28  34 
None (%) 30  33 
# Respondents 102  168 
 
3) Is there a minimum threshold above which you would find it worthwhile to 
devote efforts to producing patentable inventions? (Addressed to  respondents who 
answer “no” to question 1 or “none” to question 2) 
Yes (%) 51  59 
No (%) 49  41 
# Respondents 141  492 
     
4) What is this threshold? (Addressed to researchers who answer “no” to question 
1 or “none” to question 2, and “yes” to question 3) 
     
 4.1) All researchers 
 Mean 43.8  28.9 
 S.D.  20.4  20 
 # Respondents 72  232 
     
 4.2) Researchers who know the current royalty shares 
 Mean 50  40.41 
 S.D. 0  27.7 
 # Respondents 5  17 
     
 4.3) Researchers who do not know the current royalty shares 
 Mean 43.3  28.1 
 S.D.  21.1  19.27 
 # Respondents 67  215 
     
 Difference 4.2)-4.3) 
 Mean 6.7  12.3 
 S.D.  9.5  5 
 p-value 0.5  0.015 
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Table 7. Goals pursued with the established royalty share (from the TTO survey) 
    
 Portugal  Spain 
a. Incentivize an increase in university patenting (%) 50  93 
b. Maximize total income from patents (%) 27  31 
c. Maximize university (TTO) revenues (%) 9  5 
d. Favor the development of “spin-off” (%) 23  10 
e. Improve the scientific production of the university (%) 36  40 
f. Attract high quality researchers (%) 9  2 
    
Total number of respondents 22  45 
Notes: the responses are not mutually exclusive. Most TTOs generally selected one or two 
goals (with a few even identifying three).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10 
 
 
 
Table 8. Inventors’ quality and effectiveness of the royalty shares. Evidence for Spain (from the inventor’s survey) 
         
 Awareness High or medium importance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
 Spain 
         
USPTO - EPO 0.63***   0.64*** -0.08   -0.00 
 (0.21)   (0.21) (0.45)   (0.45) 
1 sexenio  0.16  0.17  0.13  0.13 
  (0.26)  (0.26)  (0.77)  (0.77) 
2 sexenios  0.21  0.23  -0.40  -0.43 
  (0.20)  (0.20)  (0.63)  (0.61) 
3 sexenios  0.35  0.39  0.08  0.03 
  (0.25)  (0.24)  (0.48)  (0.48) 
4 sexenios  0.58*  0.60*  -0.58  -0.80 
  (0.31)  (0.32)  (0.83)  (0.74) 
5 sexenios  0.42  0.38  -0.21  -0.40 
  (0.37)  (0.37)  (0.82)  (0.85) 
6 sexenios  0.31  0.43  -0.62  -0.85 
  (0.46)  (0.47)  (1.15)  (1.11) 
Professor   0.13 -0.03   0.04 0.30 
   (0.20) (0.23)   (0.42) (0.43) 
Male 0.60*** 0.63*** 0.60*** 0.63*** 0.43 0.50 0.44 0.39 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.22) (0.21) (0.67) (0.74) (0.73) (0.70) 
Age 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
Constant -2.32*** -2.01** -2.18*** -2.07** -4.55*** -5.17*** -4.59*** -5.20*** 
 (0.70) (0.91) (0.78) (0.91) (0.94) (1.84) (1.26) (1.60) 
         
Pseudo R2 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.15 
Observations 536 534 536 534 119 118 119 118 
         
         
 Portugal 
         
Professor   0.13    -0.54  
   (0.67)    (0.68)  
Male   0.52*    0.63  
   (0.29)    (0.77)  
Age   0.01    0.04  
   (0.02)    (0.03)  
Constant   0.58    -3.43**  
   (0.82)    (1.38)  
         
Pseudo R2   0.18    0.19  
Observations   181    84  
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate significance at a 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Clustered (at the university 
level) robust standard errors in parentheses. Estimation method: probit. The dependent variables are a dummy 
variable with value one if the inventor is aware of the inventor royalty share in her university (columns 1-4) and a 
dummy variable if the inventor claims that the inventor royalty share was of high importance at stimulating her 
effort (columns 5-8). All the regressions include a full set of university and field dummies. In the regressions we 
use all the available observations from the surveys for which all the variables needed in the regressions have non-
missing values. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
 
 
Table 1A. Replication of Table 5 estimates for Spain dropping the observations 
corresponding to the University of Cádiz and the University of Extremadura 
 Patent applications  License revenue 
 (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
Royalty share 0.01 0.01**  0.04** 0.05*** 
 (0.01) (0.01)  (0.02) (0.02) 
log(Pre-sample patent applications) 0.79*** 0.60***  0.80*** 0.02 
 (0.07) (0.10)  (0.23) (0.27) 
log(TTO/Faculty)  0.11   -0.22 
  (0.09)   (0.33) 
Age TTO  0.03   -0.02 
  (0.06)   (0.25) 
Age TTO squared  -0.00   0.00 
  (0.00)   (0.01) 
log(Faculty)  0.38**   0.55 
  (0.17)   (0.41) 
log(R&D/Faculty)  0.21   0.91*** 
  (0.14)   (0.28) 
Science park dummy variable  -0.01   0.27 
  (0.12)   (0.44) 
Constant -0.07 -5.62*  -0.35 -20.59*** 
 (0.26) (3.23)  (0.97) (6.58) 
      
Observations 178 178  148 148 
Universities 37 37  37 37 
R-squared 0.68 0.72  0.28 0.42 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. Clustered (by university) robust standard errors in parentheses. The 
dependent variable is the log of one plus the number of patent applications and 
total license revenue. All the regressions include a full set of time dummies. 
 
 
